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Among Andres Serrano's many controversial photographs—images of corpses in a morgue, 
portraits of Ku Klux Klan members, images of blood and semen pressed between glass—Piss 
Christ stands out. Before a 1997 exhibition at the National Gallery of Victoria in Australia, the 
Catholic Church sued unsuccessfully to prevent the showing of Serrano's photographs. During 
the exhibition, Piss Christ was defaced twice in 2 days: ineffectively by a man with his bare 
hands, and effectively by a teenager with a hammer (―Protestor Damages Serrano Photo,‖ 1997). 
In an era where ignorance about the arts is high, negative emotions like anger, disgust, and 
contempt are common responses to provocative and challenging works. So what do 
psychological theories of aesthetic emotions have to say about negative responses to art? How 
can we understand the emotions that lead people to reject, censor, and deface works of art? The 
study of aesthetic emotions is central to the psychology of the art (Cupchik, 2006), yet 
essentially no research has been done on negative responses to art. The present research thus 
applies a recent appraisal model of aesthetic emotions (Silvia, 2005b) to anger and disgust in 
response to visual art. This model can explain when negative aesthetic emotions occur and 
predict subtle differences between similar emotions. 
 
Theories of Aesthetic Emotions  
Negative emotions are a crucible for theories of aesthetics. We describe how the major theories 
explain negative feelings in response to art. As we will see, these theories easily explain positive 
emotions but struggle to explain negative emotions. 
 
Berlyne's Psychobiological Model 
Berlyne's (1971, 1974) landmark model explains aesthetic preference by positing opposing 
reward and aversion systems that respond to collative properties of art. Figure 1 shows the joint 
effect of the two systems. A primary reward system creates positive affect as arousal potential 
increases; after a point, a primary aversion system creates negative affect as arousal potential 
increases. Because the reward system reaches an asymptote and the aversion system does not, the 
two systems jointly create an inverted-U affect function. Berlyne's model addresses negative 
experience via the action of the primary aversion system, but positive aesthetic experience—
particularly the dimensions of pleasingness and interestingness—received nearly all of the 
attention in the Berlyne tradition (Silvia, 2006b, chap. 2).  
 
 
FIGURE 1 IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
 
 
Berlyne's explanation of negative aesthetic experience has two major limitations. First, the model 
posits only undifferentiated aversion in response to high arousal potential. Art can be aversive in 
many respects—people can be angry, sad, disgusted, or anxious—but Berlyne's model does not 
make predictions about specific negative states. Second, the model presumes that positive 
aesthetic experience always appears simultaneously with negative experience. At high levels of 
arousal potential, the reward and aversion systems are both operating (see Figure 1). This 
assumption leads to the awkward prediction that someone who intensely dislikes a painting also 
enjoys it, only less so. 
 
Martindale's Prototypicality Model 
An alternative model, developed by Martindale, proposes that people prefer art that is 
prototypical (in depiction or in style) for its category (Martindale & Moore, 1988). Research in 
cognition and emotion shows that people prefer prototypical faces, objects, and animals (see 
Halberstadt, 2006), and aesthetics research shows that preferences are influenced by 
prototypicality (Martindale, Moore, & Borkum, 1990; Martindale, Moore, & West, 1988). Much 
of the research has used simple stimuli, like color chips (Martindale & Moore, 1988) or random 
polygons (Martindale et al., 1990), but some studies have found strong prototype-preference 
effects for stylistic categories (Farkas, 2002) and designed objects (Hekkert, Snelders, & van 
Wieringen, 2003). 
 
It is hard to derive predictions about negative emotions from a prototypicality model. First, what 
feelings arise from nonprototypical works? If people prefer works central to a category, how do 
they feel about works peripheral to a category? Peripheral art could be aversive, but that would 
leave the question of how people experience neutral, indifferent feelings. Second, a single 
independent variable cannot predict differentiated negative emotions, such as fear, anger, 
sadness, disgust, and contempt. And finally, most people probably have a category of ―obscene 
art‖ or ―controversial art,‖ and works like Serrano's Piss Christ and Kovat's Virgin in a Condom 
are typical for those categories. A prototypicality model could be forced into the awkward 
prediction that people would like prototypically offensive art. 
 
Processing Fluency 
Reber, Schwartz, and Winkielman (2004) proposed that art is beautiful when it is easy to 
process. Research shows that images that are easily processed—by virtue of familiarity, priming, 
or perceptual contrast—are more pleasant (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), although researchers 
disagree over whether fluent processing is inherently positive (Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) or not (Unkelbach, 2006). The prototypicality and processing 
fluency models are similar in their predictions and mechanisms—prototypical objects are easier 
to process (Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006)—and they share the same 
limitations. High processing-fluency causes positive feelings, but it is unclear whether low 
fluency causes a neutral state or a negative emotional state. And if low fluency causes a negative 
state, it is unclear which kind of negative state occurs (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, sadness, 
contempt). Like the prototypicality model, the processing fluency model has only one variable 
(ease of processing), which makes it hard to explain diverse emotions (anger, disgust, fear). 
 
Summary 
Past theories show two major limitations. First, some theories (Martindale et al., 1990; Reber et 
al., 2004) have a hard time explaining why negative emotions would happen at all, given their 
inability to discriminate between neutral and negative feelings. Second, none of the theories can 
discriminate between negative feelings; at best, they propose an undifferentiated feeling of 
aversion (Berlyne, 1971). The challenge, then, is to develop a model that can explain (1) when 
negative aesthetic emotions happen and (2) how similar negative emotions differ from each 
other. 
 
Appraisal Theories and Aesthetic Emotions  
A recent model of aesthetic emotions (Silvia, 2005a, 2005b) connects emotional responses to art 
to the cognitive processes that undergird emotions (see Robinson, 2005, for a similar approach). 
Appraisal theories of emotion propose that emotions come from people's evaluations of events, 
particularly evaluations of how events relate to important goals, values, and concerns (Ellsworth 
& Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman & Smith, 2001). These evaluations, known as 
appraisals, give rise to emotions. Appraisal theories are inherently subjective—the appraisals of 
events, not events themselves, cause emotions. As a result, it is easy for appraisal theories to 
explain why people have different emotions to the same event (Roseman & Smith, 2001), why a 
person's emotional responses to the same event change over time, and why different traits, skills, 
and values can predict emotions (e.g., Silvia, 2006a). 
 
Appraisal theories of emotion address a broad swath of emotions: positive emotions like 
happiness, interest, and pride; negative emotions like sadness, fear, anger, disgust, shame, and 
contempt; and fringe emotions like confusion, love, and hope. As a result, appraisal theories have 
a lot to say about when people experience negative emotions. In an appraisal model, each 
emotion is traced to a set of appraisals that cause the emotion; this set is known as an appraisal 
structure (Scherer, 2001). The appraisal structure of fear, for example, involves several 
appraisals:  
 
1. Goal relevance: whether an event impinges on an important goal, value, or concern 
2. Goal congruence: whether an event furthers or obstructs a goal 
3. Coping potential: whether a person can overcome a challenge, broadly conceived (e.g., avoiding 
harm, preventing a threat, handling barriers to a goal) 
 
Appraisals of high goal relevance, low goal congruence, and low coping potential should lead to 
fear (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). The appraisal structure of happiness, in contrast, involves 
two appraisals:  
 
1. Goal relevance 
2. Goal congruence 
 
Appraisals of high goal relevance and high goal congruence should cause happiness (Lazarus, 
1991).  
 
The examples of fear and happiness illustrate how appraisal theories describe similarities 
between emotions. Intuitively, people see fear and happiness as different, even as prototypes of 
opposing categories of ―negative emotions‖ and ―positive emotions.‖ From an appraisal 
perspective, however, fear and happiness are a lot alike. Like happiness, fear involves appraising 
an event's goal relevance and goal congruence. Unlike happiness, fear involves an additional 
appraisal of coping potential. Differentiating emotions based on appraisal structures allows us to 
specify subtle differences between similar emotions, as we will see later with the emotions of 
anger and disgust. 
 
Anger and Disgust as Aesthetic Emotions  
Anger and disgust are important negative emotions. Associated with aggression and self-
assertion, anger motivates an assertive response when important goals are threatened (Kuppens, 
Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003). Anger is an approach-oriented emotion (Berkowitz & 
Harmon-Jones, 2004)—when angry, people try to deal with the threat to their goals. Associated 
with revulsion, disgust motivates the avoidance of contamination (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005; 
Rozin & Fallon, 1987), be it physical (e.g., ingesting noxious food) or symbolic (e.g., a defiling 
person, idea, or object; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Unlike anger, disgust is 
avoidance-oriented—people withdraw from the disgusting object, consistent with repulsive as a 
synonym of disgusting. Anger and disgust are common responses to aesthetic objects: people 
with traditional tastes can be disgusted and angered by confrontational works, and people with 
advanced tastes can be angry at mass-produced, sappy landscapes intended to exploit ignorant 
audiences (see Lindauer, 1990, 1991). 
 
Based on appraisal theories, we can develop predictions about the appraisals of art that will lead 
to anger and disgust. 
1
 The appraisal structure for anger involves appraisals of (1) goal 
congruence, particularly that an aesthetic object goes against one's goals or values, and (2) 
intentionality, particularly that the artist was intentionally trying to impugn one's goals or values. 
Appraising an event as intentionally goal incongruent is the core of anger (Kuppens & Van 
Mechelen, 2007). The appraisal structure for disgust involves appraisals of (1) goal 
incongruence and (2) intrinsic pleasantness, particularly that an object has aversive perceptual or 
sensory qualities (Scherer, 2001). Appraising an event as goal incongruent and aversive is the 
core of disgust (cf. Rozin et al., 1999). 
 
These appraisal structures illustrate how anger and disgust are similar and different. Both 
emotions involve appraising an event as incongruent with goals or values, but (1) anger involves 
appraising the affront as deliberate whereas disgust does not, and (2) disgust involves appraising 
the events as inherently aversive, whereas anger does not (Scherer, 2001). An appraisal approach 
can thus make subtle predictions about differences between similar emotions. 
 
The Present Experiment  
The present experiment examined whether cognitive appraisals predicted anger and disgust in 
response to visual art. Our research had three aims. First, we wanted to examine negative 
emotions, which have received little attention in the psychology of the arts. Second, our 
experiment sought to fill a gap in the appraisal model of aesthetic emotions, which thus far has 
explored only positive emotions like interest and enjoyment (Silvia, 2005a, 2005c, 2006a; Turner 
& Silvia, 2006). And finally, we wanted to illustrate how the appraisal model can make 
successful predictions for contexts in which past models are ineffective. 
 
Method  
Participants and Design 
A total of 58 people—46 women, 12 men—enrolled in General Psychology at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro participated as part of a research participation option. We did not 
analyze gender differences because of the small number of men. The ratio of women to men was 
typical for research conducted at University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
 
Procedure 
People participated in groups of 4 to 8. Upon arriving at the laboratory, people were seated at 
individual tables and given a consent form. The experimenter explained that the study was about 
different people's impressions of diverse kinds of art. She pointed out that some people might 
find some of the pictures to be in poor taste and offensive, and she emphasized that the purpose 
of the experiment was to understand how people feel about art, not to offend people or to 
disparage their beliefs. People were encouraged to be candid in their responses to the artworks, 
and they were asked not to put their names or any personally identifying information on the 
questionnaire. 
 
Each person then received a questionnaire, which contained black-and-white reproductions of 
eight paintings and photographs. Several of the works were offensive (e.g., Andres Serrano's Piss 
Christ); the others were conventional (e.g., Claude Lorraine landscapes). After viewing each 
picture, people answered questions about their appraisals of the picture and about their emotional 
responses to the picture. Disgust was measured with one item, ―I find this picture disgusting.‖ 
Anger was measured with ―This picture makes me angry.‖ Appraised goal incongruence was 
measured with ―This picture goes against my values.‖ Appraisals of pleasantness were measured 
with ―This picture is pleasant.‖ Appraised intentionality was measured with ―The artist is 
intentionally trying to offend people like me.‖ Each question had a 1 to 7 response scale 
(endpoints: not at all and yes, definitely). 
 
Results  
Overview of the Analytic Strategy 
We used multilevel modeling to estimate the relationships between appraisals and emotions (see 
Silvia, 2007). Among its many advantages, multilevel modeling allows us to estimate the within-
person relationships between appraisals and emotions (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). Within-person 
analyses fit our hypotheses—appraisal–emotion relations are presumed to covary within the 
person, not merely within the sample—and within-person analyses resist the ―third-variable 
problem‖ that besets between-person analyses (Nezlek, 2001). Individual differences that would 
be relevant to anger and disgust at art—such as openness to experience, training in the arts, or 
political ideology—vary between people but are invariant within-person. A score that does not 
vary within the person obviously cannot explain the within-person covariance of appraisals and 
emotions. 
 
The multilevel analyses were computed with HLM 6 using restricted maximum-likelihood 
estimation. All effects were estimated as random effects. The Level 1 predictors were centered at 
each person's mean. 
 
Anger 
What appraisals predicted anger? According to Scherer's (2001) model, anger entails appraising 
an event as (1) incongruent with one's goals and values, and (2) as intentionally caused. We 




In short, anger is a linear function of an intercept (B0j), slopes that represent the effects of the 
two appraisals and within-person residual variance. These intercepts and slopes are estimated as 
a function of the average intercepts and slopes across the entire sample (the γ coefficients) and 
residual between-person variance (the u coefficients). Ratings of disgust are included to control 
for the overlap between anger and disgust. 
 
As expected, both appraisals significantly predicted anger. Ratings of anger increased as people 
appraised the pictures as more incongruent with their values, b = .333, SE = .078, t(57) = 4.23, p 
< .001, and as being intentionally offensive, b = .190, SE = .067, t(57) = 2.83, p < .007. Not 
surprisingly, disgust predicted anger as well, b = .250, SE = .063, t(57) = 3.94, p < .001. 
 
Disgust 
What appraisals predicted disgust? According to Scherer's (2001) model, disgust entails 
appraising an event as (1) incongruent with one's goals and values, and (2) as inherently 




As before, the related emotion of anger was controlled for when estimating the relations between 
appraisals and disgust. 
 
As expected, both appraisals significantly predicted disgust. Ratings of disgust increased as 
people appraised the pictures as more incongruent with their values, b = .501, SE = .062, t(57) = 
8.02, p < .001, and as more unpleasant, b = −.339, SE = .038, t(57) = 8.85, p < .001. Not 
surprisingly, anger predicted disgust as well, b = .258, SE = .069, t(57) = 3.73, p < .001. 
 
Distributions of Appraisal–Emotion Relations 
One advantage of multilevel modeling is that it allows us to estimate the relations between 
appraisals and emotions for each person in the sample. The overall coefficients show that, on 
average, a person's appraisals strongly predicted his or her emotions. The aggregated 
coefficients, however, can conceal individual differences in how appraisals predict emotions. For 
example, if disgust comes from unpleasantness for some people and from goal incongruence for 
other people, then, on average, it will seem that disgust comes from both unpleasantness and goal 
incongruence (cf. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, in press). 
 
One way to assess the invariance of appraisal–emotion relations is to plot the slopes relating 
appraisals to emotions (Silvia, 2005a). The percentage of positive slopes indicates the percentage 
of people for whom appraisals predicted emotions in the expected directions. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of within-person slopes for anger. These histograms represent the frequencies of the 
unstandardized regression weights relating the appraisals to anger. For appraisals of goal 
incongruence, 91% (53 of 58) were positive. For appraisals of intentionality, 93% (54 of 58) 
were positive. Figure 3 shows the distributions of within-person slopes for disgust. For both 
appraisals, 100% of the slopes were in the proper direction. Thus, the appraisal model's 
predictions received uncommonly strong support—the predictions were met for the sample as a 




Figure 2. Distributions of the within-person slopes relating appraisals of goal incongruence 
(top) and intentionality (bottom) to anger.  
 
 
Figure 3. Distributions of the within-person slopes relating appraisals of pleasantness (top) and 
goal incongruence (bottom) to disgust. 
 
General Discussion  
Appraisals, Anger, and Disgust 
Modern research on aesthetics, like past research, heavily emphasizes positive responses to the 
arts over negative responses (e.g., Levorato & Ronconi, 2006; Nadal, Marty, & Munar, 2006; 
Smith, Bousquet, Chang, & Smith, 2006). The present experiment examined anger and disgust in 
response to art. Earlier in this article, we contended that past theories have a hard time explaining 
negative aesthetic emotions. Appraisal theories, in contrast, easily explain negative aesthetic 
emotions. Anger and disgust should occur when people make the appraisals that constitute each 
emotion's appraisal structure. Furthermore, similar emotions like anger and disgust can be 
differentiated based on the differences in their appraisal structures. In the experiment, people 
viewed controversial and conventional images and gave ratings of emotions and appraisals for 
each picture. Within-person analyses showed that appraisals of the images strongly predicted 
emotional responses to the images: anger was associated with appraisals of goal incongruence 
and intentionality, and disgust was associated with appraisals of goal incongruence and 
unpleasantness. 
 
Appraisal theories contend that emotions come from people's personal understandings of 
events—subjective appraisals of what an event means for oneself, not objective stimulus 
features, cause emotions. It is no surprise, then, that different people will have different 
emotional responses to an event. Even extreme stimuli, such as blasphemous and offensive art, 
will provoke a range of reactions. In the present sample, anger in response to Piss Christ had a 
U-shaped distribution: 39% of the sample marked a 6 or 7 on the 1 to 7 scale ―This picture 
makes me angry,‖ and 36% of the sample marked a 1 or 2. Negative aesthetic emotions are in the 
eye of the appraiser—they come from evaluations of how art relates to one's goals and values—
so even cheery, benign art can make people mad. Some art historians, for instance, become angry 
and contemptuous in response to the tranquil landscape paintings of Thomas Kinkade because 
they appraise features of Kinkade's work—mass-production, naive sentimentality, and pandering 
to an antiart audience—as contrary to their values. As art critic Kenneth Clark contended, 
―[Thomas Kinkade's] works are facsimiles of something inherently dead. Escapism is not art. He 
might as well not exist. He could just be a branding concept. He might as well be selling 
hamburgers‖ (della Cava, 2002). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the within-person analyses rule out common ―third variable‖ 
explanations. The coefficients indicate the average within-person relationships between 
appraisals and emotions, and within-person relationships are unconfounded by between-person 
variables (Nezlek, 2001). Furthermore, the within-person analyses allowed us to examine 
variability in the within-person effects. As Figures 2 and 3 show, the appraisal–emotion relations 
were in the predicted directions for nearly every person in the sample. The appraisal model's 
predictions thus received unusually strong support. 
 
Are Negative Emotions Aesthetic Emotions? 
Negative aesthetic emotions pose an interesting question: are all emotions aesthetic emotions, or 
do only some emotions qualify? Some researchers restrict the class of aesthetic emotions to a 
few emotions, typically positive ones. Konečni (2005), for example, regards feelings of being 
moved, awe, and thrills as the central aesthetic feelings (cf. Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Others have 
suggested that the central aesthetic emotion is the experience of beauty (Reber et al., 2004), 
interest (Tan, 2000), or disinterested pleasure (see Robinson, 2005, for a review). On the other 
hand, some researchers have proposed that all emotions are aesthetic emotions (Lazarus, 1991, 
pp. 292–296). People can experience the full range of human feelings in response to art, so 
modern researchers should not restrict themselves to the handful of feelings that have been 
popular with past theories. 
 
Whether or not an emotion ―really is‖ an aesthetic emotion is an unanswerable and unproductive 
question; whether an emotion deserves more attention from researchers interested in aesthetics, 
however, is a straightforward question. We see two reasons why negative emotions deserve more 
attention. First, negative emotions form the core of cultural and ideological conflicts over the 
arts. We doubt that a photograph like Piss Christ is attacked because people find it hard to 
process, atypical of its category, or too complex. Instead, controversial art makes some people 
mad, and one of anger's consequences is a tendency to aggress against the perceived source of 
affront. Understanding censorship, funding disputes, class differences in art preferences, and the 
defacement of art requires understanding negative reactions to the arts. Second, artists often try 
to express negative emotions in their work and attempt to evoke negative emotions in the 
audience, thereby spurring the audience to reflect on and learn from the negative feelings 
(Robinson, 2005). To be credible, a psychology of aesthetics must have something to say about 
how this works. 
 
Emotion Psychology and the Arts 
One of Berlyne's (1971, 1974) most influential ideas was his proposal that psychologists could 
study aesthetics using mainstream theories of motivation and emotion. This idea detached 
psychological aesthetics from philosophical aesthetics and rooted the fledgling field of 
experimental aesthetics within established, successful theories. Berlyne's (1971) model of 
aesthetics, for example, was a straightforward application of his model of arousal and reward 
(Berlyne, 1967). Later theories of aesthetics disagreed about which models of motivation and 
emotion apply to aesthetic experience, but they agreed that aesthetics can be explained using 
mainstream psychological concepts (e.g., Martindale et al., 1990; Reber et al., 2004). Our 
appraisal approach to aesthetic emotions follows in this tradition. We agree with Berlyne's claim 
that psychology can create its own aesthetic theories: psychology should take inspiration from 
philosophy and art history, but it need not adhere to ideas found in these areas. 
 
Our model of aesthetic emotions is a simple extension of appraisal theories of emotion, but 
interdisciplinary research should go both ways: emotion psychology offers a powerful 
perspective on aesthetics, and the study of aesthetics informs and enhances mainstream emotion 
psychology. Research on emotion has emphasized emotions in response to major adaptational 
crises (e.g., fear in response to threat, sadness in response to loss) or to significant personal 
events (e.g., happiness in response to important events). There is no question that emotions 
facilitate adaption to major events (Lazarus, 1991), but emotions influence all areas of everyday 
life. The psychology of aesthetics illuminates how people create objects (e.g., paintings, plays, 
and feature films) to manipulate others' emotions, how people structure their environments to 
foster particular emotions (e.g., choosing art posters to hang on a bedroom wall), and how the 
deep evolutionary history of emotion intersects with the pancultural practice of the arts. The 




 Appraisal theories disagree on the appraisals that cause an emotion. Some appraisal theories 
propose complex appraisal structures (e.g., Scherer, 2001); other theories propose simple 
appraisal structures (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Nevertheless, there's 
substantial agreement overall (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), and the appraisal structures that we're 
using for the present research are consistent with most appraisal theories. Appraisals of goal 
relevance are omitted here (and not measured in the experiment) because they are implicated in 
nearly all emotions, and our interest is in how anger and disgust differ. 
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